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On Ergodic Secrecy Capacity of Multiple Input
Wiretap Channel with Statistical CSIT
Shih-Chun Lin and Pin-Hsun Lin
Abstract—We consider the secure transmission in ergodic
fast-Rayleigh fading multiple-input single-output single-antenna-
eavesdropper (MISOSE) wiretap channels. We assume that the
statistics of both the legitimate and eavesdropper channels is
the only available channel state information at the transmitter
(CSIT). By introducing a new secrecy capacity upper bound,
we prove that the secrecy capacity is achieved by Gaussian
input without prefixing. To attain this, we form another MISOSE
channel for upper-bounding, and tighten the bound by finding
the worst correlations between the legitimate and eavesdropper
channel coefficients. The resulting upper bound is tighter than
the others in the literature which are based on modifying the
correlation between the noises at the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper. Next, we fully characterize the ergodic secrecy
capacity by showing that the optimal channel input covariance
matrix is a scaled identity matrix, with the transmit power
allocated uniformly among the antennas. The key to solve such a
complicated stochastic optimization problem is by exploiting the
completely monotone property of the ergodic secrecy capacity
to use the stochastic ordering theory. Finally, our simulation
results show that for the considered channel setting, the secrecy
capacity is bounded in both the high signal-to-noise ratio and
large number of transmit antenna regimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel is the maximum
achievable secrecy rate between the transmitter and a legiti-
mate receiver, and a perfect secrecy constraint is imposed to
make no information be attainable by an eavesdropper [1] [2].
In the wireless environments, the time-varying characteristic
of fading channels can also be exploited to enhance the
secrecy capacity [3]. Further enhancements are attainable by
employing multiple antennas at each node, e.g., in [4] [5].
However, these secrecy capacity results [3]–[5] rely on perfect
knowledge of the legitimate receiver’s channel state informa-
tion at the transmitter (CSIT). Because of the limited feedback
bandwidth and the delay caused by channel estimation, it
may be hard to track the channel coefficients if they vary
rapidly. Thus for fast-fading channels, it is more practical to
consider the case with only partial CSIT of the legitimate
channel. However, in this case, only some lower and upper
bounds of the secrecy capacity are known [6] [7], and the
secrecy capacity is unknown. Although the general secrecy
capacity formula is reported in [1], the optimal auxiliary
random variable for prefixing in this formula is still unknown.
In this letter, we consider one important scenario of partial
CSIT, i.e., the transmitter only knows the statistics of both the
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legitimate and eavesdropper channels but not the realizations
of them. Under this scenario, we derive the secrecy capacity
of the fast-fading, multiple-input single-output single-antenna-
eavesdropper (MISOSE) wiretap channels, where the trans-
mitter has multiple antennas while the legitimate receiver and
eavesdropper each have single antenna. Both the coefficients of
the legitimate and eavesdropper channels are Rayleigh faded.
We first propose a new secrecy capacity upper bound to
show that the transmission scheme in [6] is secrecy-capacity
achieving, which is based on [1] with Gaussian input but
without prefixing. Then we find the optimal channel input
covariance matrix analytically to fully characterize the ergodic
secrecy capacity, while such a optimization problem is solved
numerically in [6] without guaranteeing the optimality. The
key is to exploit the completely monotone property of the
ergodic secrecy capacity, then invoking the stochastic ordering
theory [8].
To obtain a tighter secrecy capacity upper bound than that
reported in [7], we introduce another MISOSE channel with
a relaxed secrecy constraint for upper-bounding, while finding
the worst correlations between the coefficients of the legitimate
and eavesdropper channels to tighten the bound. In [7], the
upper bound is obtained by directly applying the concepts
from [3] [4] where the correlation is only introduced between
the noises at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper and the
secrecy constraint is left unchanged. Note that the secrecy
capacity lower bound in [7] is indeed not achievable. In order
to achieve such a bound, the variable-rate coding in [3] must
be invoked, where the full CSIT of the legitimate channel
must be used to vary the transmission rate in every channel
fading state. This can not be done with only statistical CSIT
of the legitimate channel as in our setting. In addition to
the CSIT assumptions, the secrecy capacity result of [3] is
builded on the ergodic slow fading channel assumption where
coding among lots of slow fading channel blocks (each block
with lots of coded symbols) is used. This assumption may be
unrealistic owing to the long latency. For fast fading channels
with full CSIT of legitimate channel and statistical CSIT of
the eavesdropper channel, only some achievability results are
known [9]. In contrast to our results, in [9], the prefixing in
[1] may be useful to increase the secrecy rate. More detailed
comparisons between our results and those in [7] [6] [3] can
be found in Remarks 1 and 2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the considered MISOSE wiretap channel, we study the
problem of reliably communicating a secret message w from
the transmitter to the legitimate receiver subject to a con-
straint on the information attainable by the eavesdropper (in
2upcoming (4)). The received signals y and z at the legitimate
receiver and eavesdropper (each with single antenna) from the
transmitter equipped with multiple-antenna, can be represented
respectively as ∗
y = hHx+ ny, (1)
z = gHx+ nz, (2)
where x is a Nt ×1 complex vector representing the transmitted
vector signal, Nt is the number of transmit antennas, while ny
and nz are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circu-
larly symmetric additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean
and unit variance at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper,
respectively. In (1) and (2), h and g are both Nt × 1 complex
vectors, and representing the channels from the transmitter to
the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper, respectively.
In this work, the channels are assumed to be fast Rayleigh
fading. That is, h ∼ CN(0,σ2hI) and g ∼ CN(0,σ2gI), respec-
tively, while h, g, ny and nz are independent. The channel
coefficients change in every symbol time. We assume that
the legitimate receiver knows the instantaneous channel state
information of h perfectly, while the eavesdropper knows those
of h and g perfectly. As for the CSIT, only the distributions
of h and g are known at the transmitter, while the realizations
of h and g are unknown. Thus the transmitter is subjected to
a power constraint as
Tr(Σx)≤ P, (3)
where Σx is the covariance matrix of x in (1) and (2).
The perfect secrecy and secrecy capacity are defined as fol-
lows. Consider a (2NR,N)-code with an encoder that maps the
message w ∈WN = {1,2, . . . ,2NR} into a length-N codeword;
and a decoder at the legitimate receiver that maps the received
sequence yN (the collections of y over the code length N) from
the legitimate channel (1) to an estimated message wˆ ∈ WN .
We then have the following definitions.
Definition 1 (Secrecy Capacity [3]) Perfect secrecy is
achievable with rate R if, for any ε′ > 0, there exists a
sequence of (2NR,N)-codes and an integer N0 such that for
any N > N0
H(w|zN ,hN ,gN)/N > R− ε′,and Pr(wˆ 6= w)≤ ε′, (4)
where w is the secret message, zN ,hN , and gN are the col-
lections of z,h, and g over code length N, respectively. The
secrecy capacity Cs is the supremum of all achievable secrecy
rates.
III. SECRECY CAPACITY OF THE MISOSE FAST
RAYLEIGH FADING WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we fully characterize the secrecy capacity
of the MISOSE fast Rayleigh fading channel in the upcoming
∗ In this letter, ‖a‖ is the vector norm of vector a. The trace and complex
conjugate transpose of matrix A is denoted by Tr(A) and AH, respectively.
The diagonal matrix is denoted by diag(.). The zero-mean complex Gaussian
random vector with covariance matrix Σ is denoted as CN(0,Σ). For random
variables (vectors) A and B, p(A) is the probability distribution function (PDF)
of A, I(A;B) denotes the mutual information between them while H(A|B)
denotes the conditional differential entropy. We use A → B →C to represent
that A,B, and C form a Markov chain. All the logarithm operations are of
base 2 such that the unit of rates is in bit.
Theorem 2. Before that, we present the following Theorem 1
which shows that the scheme in [6], which uses Gaussian x
without prefixing in [1], is capacity achieving. By introducing
new bounding techniques, we obtain tighter secrecy capacity
upper bound than that in [7] to attain the secrecy cpapcity.
For such a upper bound, we form a better degraded MISOSE
channel of (1)(2) with a less stringent perfect secrecy con-
straint than (4) (in the upcoming (6)), and tighten the upper
bound by carefully introducing correlations to the channels h
and g (in the upcoming (8)).
Theorem 1 For the MISOSE fast Rayleigh fading wiretap
channel (1)(2) with the statistical CSIT of h and g, using
Gaussain x without prefixing is the optimal transmission
strategy. And the non-zero secrecy capacity Cs is obtained only
when σh > σg, which is
Cs =max
Σx
(
Eh
[
log
(
1+hHΣxh
)]
−Eg
[
log
(
1+ gHΣxg
)])
, (5)
where Σx is the covariance matrix of the Gaussian channel
input x and subject to (3), while h ∼ CN(0,σ2hI) and g ∼
CN(0,σ2gI).
Proof: From [6], we know that the right-hand-side (RHS)
of (5) is achievable and serves as a secrecy capacity lower-
bound. Now we present our new secrecy capacity upper bound
which matches the RHS of (5). The key for establishing such
an upper-bound is first forming a better MISOSE channel than
(1)(2) in terms of higher secrecy capacity, and applying the
results in [1]. First, we consider a better scenario where the
eavesdropper does not know the realizations of h, and (4)
becomes
H(w|zN ,gN)/N > R− ε′,and Pr(wˆ 6= w)≤ ε′. (6)
As in [10], equivalently, we can respectively treat the output
of the legitimate channel as (y,h) while that of the eavesdrop-
per channel as (z,g). From [11], the secrecy capacity under
constraint (6) is only related to the marginal distributions
p(y,h|x) and p(z,g|x). Then for any joint conditional PDF
py′,h′,z,g|x such that p(y′,h′|x) = p(y,h|x), the secrecy capacity
under constraint (6) is the same. Now we introduce our same
marginal legitimate channel p(y′,h′|x) for (1), which is formed
by replacing h in y with h′ = (σh/σg)g as
y′ = (h′)Hx+ ny = ((σh/σg)g)Hx+ ny. (7)
Since x is independent of h and g due to our CSIT assumption,
both h′ and h have the same conditional distributions condi-
tion on x (which equal to CN(0,σ2hI)). Then we know that
p(y′,h′|x)=p(y,h|x). From (7), we will focus on the MISOSE
channel in the following,
y′′ = gHx+(σg/σh)ny, z = gHx+ nz. (8)
We now use the secrecy capacity of the MISOSE channel
(8), under constraint (6), to upper-bound that of the original
channel (1)(2). Again, we can treat as (y′′,g) and (z,g) as the
output of the legitimate channel and that of the eavesdropper
channel in (8), respectively. As in [9], we apply this fact into
3the secrecy capacity formula of [1],
Cs ≤ maxp(U,x)
I(U ;y′′,g)− I(U ;z,g) (9)
= max
p(U,x)
I(U ;y′′|g)− I(U ;z|g), (10)
≤max
px
I(x;y′′|z,g). (11)
where U in (9) is an auxiliary random variable for prefixing,
which forms the Markov chain U → x→ (y′′,z,g); the equality
(10) follows from [10] by the independence of U and g due
to our CSIT assumptions; and the inequality (11) is from [5].
When σg <σh, the equivalent channel (8) is degraded, and x→
y′′ → z given g. From [12], apply the Markov chain property
to (11)
Cs ≤ maxpx
I(x;y′′|g)− I(x;z|g). (12)
From [4], we know that Gaussian x is optimal for the upper
bound in (12), and the upper-bound in (12) matches the RHS
of (5) when σg < σh. Note that when σg < σh, the RHS of (5)
is positive. In contrast, when σg ≥ σh, the upper bound in (11)
is zero since from (8), x → z → y′′ given g. And it concludes
the proof.
Remark 1: When the transmitter additionally knows the
realizations of h, e. g. [3], the legitimate channel (7) is not a
same marginal channel of (1). In this case, given x, h may not
be Gaussian but h′ = (σh/σg)g is Gaussian, and p(y′,h′|x)
from (7) may not equal to p(y,h|x) from (1), In our case, the
CSIT assumption makes x independent of h and g, then the
legitimate channel in (7) has the same marginal as that in (1).
Then we can get rid of the unrealistic ergodic slow fading
assumptions in [3] and find the secrecy capacity in fast fading
channel. Note that the upper-bound in [7] is obtained by
directly applying the derivations in [3] to fast fading channel,
and is looser than the upper-bound (11) which is based on
the channel (8) and is tightened by the “worst” correlation
between h and g (h = g).
Now we show that the optimal Σx of (5) is
diag{P/NT , . . . ,P/NT}, and fully characterize the secrecy
capacity as follows.
Theorem 2 For the MISOSE fast Rayleigh fading wiretap
channel (1)(2) with the statistical CSIT of h and g, under
power constraint P, the non-zero secrecy capacity Cs is
obtained only when σh > σg, which is
Cs = Eh
[
log
(
1+P ||h||
2
NT
)]
−Eg
[
log
(
1+P ||g||
2
NT
)]
, (13)
where h∼CN(0,σ2hI), g∼CN(0,σ2gI), and NT is the number
of transmit antennas.
Proof: Subjecting to (3), after substituting h∼CN(0,σ2hI)
and g ∼ CN(0,σ2gI) into the optimization problem in (5), it
becomes
max
Σx
(
Eg
[
log
σ2g/σ
2
h + gHΣxg
σ2g/σ
2
h
]
−Eg
[
log(1+ gHΣxg)
])
. (14)
By using the eigenvalue decomposition Σx = UDUH , where U
is unitary and D is diagonal, finding the optimal Σ∗x of (14) is
equivalent to solving
max
U,D
(
Eg
[
log
(
σ2g/σ
2
h + gHUDUHg
)]
−Eg
[
log(1+ gHUDUHg)
])
,
=max
D
(
Eg
[
log
(
σ2g/σ
2
h + gHDg
)]
−Eg
[
log(1+ gHDg)
])
,
(15)
where the equality comes from the fact that the distribution
of g ∼CN(0,σ2gI) is unchanged by the rotation of unitary U,
and we can set Σx = D (U = I) without loss of optimality.
In the following, we show that subjecting to Tr(D)≤ P, the
optimal D for (15) is
D∗ = diag{P/NT ,P/NT , · · · ,P/NT}. (16)
First of all, from [6, Section V], the optimal D for (15) satisfies
Tr(D) = P. For any D = [d1,d2, · · · ,dNT ] where ∑di = P and
di ≥ 0,∀i, we want to prove that for D∗ defined in (16)
Eg
[
log
(
a+ gHDg
)]
−Eg
[
log
(
1+ gHDg
)]
≤Eg
[
log
(
a+ gHD∗g
)]
−Eg
[
log
(
1+ gHD∗g
)]
, (17)
where we denote σ2g/σ2h by a, which belongs to [0,1). Here
we introduce some results from the stochastic ordering theory
[8] to proceed.
Definition 2 [8, p.234] A function ψ(x) : [0,∞) → R is
completely monotone if for all x > 0 and n = 0,1,2, · · · , its
derivative ψ(n) exists and (−1)nψ(n)(x)≥ 0.
Definition 3 [8, (5.A.1)] Let B1 and B2 be two nonnegative
random variables such that E[e−sB1 ]≥E[e−sB2 ], for all s > 0.
Then B1 is said to be smaller than B2 in the Laplace transform
order, denoted as B1 ≤LT B2.
Lemma 1 [8, Th. 5.A.4] Let B1 and B2 be two nonnegative
random variables. If B1 ≤LT B2 then E[ f (B1)] ≤ E[ f (B2)],
where the first derivative of a differentiable function f on
[0,∞) is completely monotone, provided that the expectations
exist.
To prove (17), we let B1 = gHDg, B2 = gHD∗g, and
f (x) = log(a+ x)− log(1+ x) to invoke Lemma 1. It can be
easily verified that ψ(x), the first derivative of f (x), satisfies
Definition 2. More specifically, the nth derivative of ψ meets
ψ(n)(x) =
{
n!
(a+x)n+1
− n!
(1+x)n+1 > 0, if n is even,
−n!
(a+x)n+1
+ n!
(1+x)n+1 < 0, if n is odd,
(18)
when x > 0, since a ∈ [0,1). Now from Lemma 1 and Defini-
tion 3, we know that to prove (17) is equivalent to proving
E[e−sB1 ] ≥ E[e−sB2 ] or log(E[e−sB1 ]/E[e−sB2 ]) ≥ 0, ∀s > 0.
From [13, p.40], we know that
log
(
E[e−sB1 ]
E[e−sB2 ]
)
=
NT∑
k=1
log(1+ 2d∗k s)−
NT∑
k=1
log(1+ 2dks). (19)
To show that the above is nonnegative, we resort to the
majorization theory. Note that ∑NTk=1 log(1+ 2 ˇdks) is a Schur-
concave function [14] in ( ˇd1, . . . , ˇdNT ), ∀s > 0, and by the
definition of majorization [14]
(d∗1 , · · · ,d∗NT ) = (P/NT , P/NT , · · · , P/NT )≺ (d1, d2, · · ·dNT ),
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where b ≺ a means that b is majorized by a. Thus from [14],
we know that the RHS of (19) is nonnegative, ∀s > 0. Then
(17) is valid, and D∗ is the optimal D for (15). Note that D∗
is also the optimal Σx of (5) according to the discussion under
(15). Substituting D∗ in (16) as the optimal Σx into the target
function of (5), we have (13).
Remark 2: In [6, Sec. VII], the optimal Σx for (13) is found
by an iterative algorithm without guaranteeing the optimality.
The contribution of Theorem 2 is analytically finding the
optimal Σx, which equals to D∗ in (16), by exploiting the
completely monotone property of the ergodic secrecy capacity
and invoking Lemma 1. Finally, as discussed in Section I,
the secrecy rate lower-bound in [7] is not achievable, thus
the conclusion in [7] that uniform power allocation among
transmit antennas as (16) is not secrecy capacity achieving is
wrong.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we compare the secrecy capacities under
different channel conditions. The transmit signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) is defined as P in dB scale since ny and ny both have
unit variances. In Fig. 1 we compare the secrecy capacities
with NT = 2 under different σg/σh. The secrecy capacity
increases with decreasing σg/σh. The capacity converges to
2 log(σh/σg) when the SNR is high, which meets (13) with
large P. In Fig. 2, we compare the secrecy capacities with
different numbers of transmit antennas NT . We can also find
that the capacity converges when NT is large enough. This
results can be easily seen by letting NT → ∞ in (13), and
applying the central limit theorem on ||h||2/NT and ||g||2/NT ,
respectively.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we derived the secrecy capacity of the
MISOSE ergodic fast Rayliegh fading wiretap channel, where
only the statistical CSIT of the legitimate and eavesdropper
channels is known. By introducing a new secrecy capacity
upper bound, we first showed that Gaussian input without
prefixing is secrecy capacity achieving. Then we analytically
found the optimal channel input covariance matrix, and fully
characterized the secrecy capacity.
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